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yaLI corea-Levy 1
Making Sense Of Reasonable Doubt: Understanding  
Certainty, Doubt, And Rule-Based Bias Filtering
I. InTroducTIon: an undeLIvered PromIse
The Winship doctrine requires more than simply a trial ritual. 
A doctrine establishing so fundamental a substantive constitutional 
standard must also require that the factfinder will rationally apply 
that standard to the facts in evidence.
~Justice Potter Stewart.2
J
urors are essentially asked to answer two questions when 
deliberating the fate of an accused in a criminal trial: 
(1) Do you think the defendant is guilty?; (2) If so, how 
certain are you of their guilt—namely, are you certain 
beyond a reasonable doubt?3
This article explores the feeling of certainty which jurors 
rely on when making a determination of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt in criminal prosecutions. The descriptive portion of 
this article is composed of three factual claims: (1) jurors are 
left to rely on their feelings of certainty in reaching verdicts, 
instead of coming to conclusions based on a well defined rule or 
set of instructions because reasonable doubt is not well defined; 
(2) the feeling of certainty 
alone is an unreliable method 
for determining the strength 
or weakness of the case 
presented; and (3) the fickle 
nature of reasonable doubt 
is further exacerbated by the 
fecund existence of biases.
The prescriptive portion 
of this article, crudely stated, 
is to use a jury instruction 
that requires the jury to create 
a paradigmatic example of 
reasonable doubt before the 
facts of the case have been 
presented. The jury would 
subsequently be instructed by the judge to reference the 
example and compare it to the specific facts presented. 
The purpose of this two-step process is to create a 
standard before biases have the ability to surreptitiously 
affect the standard. Moreover, jurors will have a standard 
against which the feeling of certainty can be checked. The 
empirical research supporting this prescription will be 
explored throughout this article.
Section II provides a brief history of reasonable doubt to 
illustrate its place and purpose in the criminal justice system. 
Section III provides insight, through a linguistic analysis, into 
the reasons that reasonable doubt is so hard to define, thus, 
providing some of the tools necessary to solve the problem. 
Section IV reviews research in the cognitive sciences that 
demonstrates that the feeling of knowing is a poor indicator of 
guilt or innocence.
Section V examines concrete biases found in jury trials 
and the pervasive nature of biases in general. By implementing 
findings in the cognitive and social sciences, the section demon-
strates how biases about which we may be unaware nonetheless 
affect the decisions we make, including coming to conclusions 
of guilt and innocence in criminal trials.4
Section VI sets forth the first step toward the prescriptive 
solution. It demonstrates how applying rule-based reasoning 
can help filter out biases. Coupled with Section VII, which 
further elaborates on 
the implementation of 
the jury instruction, 
these two sections 
constitute the prescrip-
tive claim. Finally, 
Section VIII addresses 
a concern that may 
remain. Specifically, 
it addresses work by 
Gregory Mitchell that 
suggests people may 
automatically correct 
biases without ever 
having the need to 
consciously correct 
them. This article argues that the malleability of the rea-
sonable doubt concept creates fertile ground for conviction 
decisions based on implicit biases that should play no role in 
the decision making process.
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where “proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary 
to constitute the crime with which [one] is charged” has been 
established.18 The Court reasoned that this heightened standard 
of proof was necessary in criminal cases because “[t]he accused 
during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense 
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose 
his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he 
would be stigmatized by the conviction.”19
The opinion in Winship further supports the historical 
weight of the standard by asserting the importance “in our free 
society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs 
have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty 
of a criminal offense without convincing a proper fact finder of 
his guilt with the utmost certainty.”20 In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Harlan reasoned that a standard higher than a “prepon-
derance of the evidence” was needed because of “a fundamental 
value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict 
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”21 However, 
the Winship Court provided no guidance with respect to 
a definition, leaving the language used to convey the concept 
of “reasonable doubt” in the hands of the lower courts.22
Twenty-four years after Winship, the Court was given the 
opportunity to clarify the reasonable doubt concept in Victor 
v. Nebraska.23 Unfortunately, the Court did not take advantage 
of that opportunity. The opinion begins with Justice O’Connor 
acknowledging that “[a]lthough [reasonable doubt] is an ancient 
and honored aspect of our criminal justice system, it defies easy 
explication.”24 The opinion further asserts that the Constitution 
neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor 
requires a definition from trial courts.25 “Indeed, so long as the 
court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not 
require that any particular form of words be used in advising the 
jury of the government’s burden of proof.”26
The closest thing to a standard found in the opinion is that 
“[t]he Constitutional question . . . is whether there is a reason-
able likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow 
conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship stan-
dard.”27 Thus, lower courts have a tremendous amount of latitude 
when it comes to articulating reasonable doubt to jurors.28
Due to the latitude given to lower courts when implementing 
reasonable doubt, court instructions have ranged broadly.29 
For example, some state and federal courts have concluded 
that instructions need not be given unless the jury requests an 
instruction.30 Other courts require instructions in all cases.31 
Yet other courts prevent the term from being defined even 
when jurors who express confusion with the meaning of the 
concept explicitly request an instruction.32 According to these 
courts, defining reasonable doubt actually makes the concept 
less clear to jurors.33 Given that experts in the field are unable 
to reach a consensus on the definition, it is not surprising that 
II. a reasonaBLe hIsTory
I find it rather unsettling that we are using a formulation that 
we believe will become less clear the more we explain it.
~Jon Newman, Chief Judge of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit5
It is not hyperbole to say that life, liberty, and justice are 
on the line in criminal cases. The risk of a false conviction or 
an erroneous release of a criminal back into society rests on 
the tenuous concept of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt”—a 
concept so fragile that some courts have opined that any attempt 
to define it could only lead to, at best, no clarification of the 
concept and, at worst, further “confusion.”6
Yet, belief beyond a reasonable doubt has been a barometer 
of justice in criminal cases since at least the mid-nineteenth 
century.7 Reasonable doubt was put forth as a means of getting 
a jury to meet a “moral certainty.”8 In turn, moral certainty 
was seen as the highest possible degree of certainty attainable 
when mathematical certainty was not possible.9 Thus, moral 
certainty was the highest possible certainty attainable through 
inductive inquiries, in contrast to mathematical certainty which 
was the certainty attainable through strictly deductive reasoning 
(i.e. formal logic and mathematics).10 For example, we can be 
mathematically certain that five minus four equals one, but 
only morally certain that the earth revolves around the sun.11 As 
Professor Steve Sheppard has phrased it: “For a writer in 1800 
to claim, ‘I am morally certain,’ roughly equates to my saying 
two centuries later, ‘I am as certain as I can be, based on what 
I have seen and heard.’”12
Regardless of whether the concept of moral certainty 
clarifies that of reasonable doubt, beginning in the nineteenth 
century the two concepts were viewed as wedded to—if not 
synonymous with—one another.13 This is important for under-
standing the weight that reasonable doubt was meant to carry. 
Reasonable doubt was supposed to mean the highest possible 
level of inductive certainty.
Interestingly, the use of “reasonable doubt” may in fact 
have been introduced to help the prosecution, not to prevent 
wrongful convictions.14 Reasonable doubt was seen as more 
favorable to prosecutors than other permissible instructions 
such as the following given by John Adams: “Where you are 
doubtful never act; that is, if you doubt the prisoner’s guilt, 
never declare him guilty; this is always the rule, especially in 
cases of life.”15 In short, “a reasonable doubt” allowed more 
room for error than “any doubt.”16
Despite the reasonable doubt standard’s protracted usage, 
the Supreme Court did not establish it as an explicit constitutional 
standard until 1970 in the case of In re Winship.17 In Winship, 
the Court held that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments allow for criminal convictions only 
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empirical evidence shows that jurors, often tasked with making the 
decisions regarding the fate of the accused, do not understand 
the concept, and often misapply it.34
The history of reasonable doubt thus reveals a concept of 
great importance that has nonetheless been vaguely articulated. 
It is with this significance and vagueness in mind that this article 
advocates for a need to better “define” reasonable doubt.35 The 
subsequent section will elucidate the reasons behind reasonable 
doubt’s vagueness.
III. The good, The Bad and The reasonaBLe: 
vague words gaLore
It is difficult, if not impossible, to so define [the term reasonable 
doubt] as to satisfy a subtle and metaphysical mind, bent on 
the detection of some point, however attenuated, upon which to 
hang a criticism.
~Supreme Court of Virginia36
One of the primary challenges in attempting to standardize 
reasonable doubt and to subsequently create a rule for applying 
it is the term’s inherent vagueness.37 As a first step in devising 
a definition for reasonable doubt, this section explains why the 
problem arises.
It is no secret that the word “reasonable” is vague. Legal 
scholars tend to treat vagueness with great trepidation, if not 
outright disdain.38 Yet, logicians and philosophers since at least 
Eubulides have recognized that vagueness is fecund.39 Take a 
leg off of a chair—is it still a chair? How many pieces of a 
car can one remove before it ceases to be a car? Almost any 
object can be turned into a “vagueness problem.” Despite being 
surrounded by vagueness, we seem able to refer to things with 
general success. This is partly due to the surrounding context. 
Although “a heap of sand” is vague, if a construction worker has 
seen the hole that the sand is meant to fill, vagueness ceases to be 
a practical challenge to fulfilling the request.40 It is through this 
context that we come to “know” what is meant by the word “heap.”
Part of the confusion comes from the fact that English, 
unlike some other languages, lacks an important linguistic 
distinction. Namely, to “know” can mean either “knowledge by 
acquaintance” or “knowledge by description.”41 In the “heap” 
example, the construction worker knew what “heap” meant 
through acquaintance, that is, she saw the specifications that 
“heap” had to satisfy. In this sense, “heap” is self-explanatory. 
However, attempting to define “heap” with words is a Sisyphean 
task, leaving even the best definition wanting for more.
Understanding this distinction helps shed light on Justice 
Stewart’s famous line in Jacobellis v. Ohio, “I know it when I 
see it.”42 Stewart intuitively realized that defining pornography 
was not an easy task, in part because it required knowledge by 
acquaintance—one cannot fully understand the meaning of 
pornography through words alone.43 It is doubtful that Stewart 
was explicitly aware of the semantic distinction between the 
two types of knowledge. He realized he knew what pornography 
was, yet was still unable to develop an articulable definition.44
Similarly, “reasonable doubt” may seem deceptively easy 
to understand, yet elusive when one tries to articulate with a 
traditional definition. This is because it is a concept that is much 
better understood through acquaintance than by description, 
much like “pornography.”
In Section VII, the “definition” of reasonable doubt through 
a jury instruction requiring jurors to come up with paradigmatic 
examples will be explained. This section underscores the impor-
tance of such an unconventional jury instruction.
Iv. KnowIng! we Know. or, on BeIng cerTaIn
Despite how certainty feels, it is neither a conscious choice 
nor even a thought process. Certainty and similar states of 
“knowing what we know” arise out of involuntary brain mecha-
nisms that, like love or anger, function independently of reason.45
~Robert A. Burton, Neuroscientist
Reasonable doubt is deeply interrelated with the feeling of 
certainty.46 Thus, one would hope—and it often seems taken 
for granted—that the feeling of certainty arises as a result of 
well-founded reasoning. This section demonstrates the folly of 
this assumption.
a. cerTaInTy and accuracy: unfaIThfuL Lovers
Certainty is important to our analysis of reasonable doubt 
because the feeling of certainty is what gives reasonable doubt 
its seal of approval, and thus, is the putative executioner of 
justice in criminal trials.47 If the criminal justice system has 
implemented reasonable doubt solely for the sake of ensuring 
a good night’s sleep to those deciding the fate of the accused, 
then there is little need for further analysis. However, if we 
are interested in truly achieving justice, an important question 
arises: How well does the feeling of certainty correlate with 
accuracy? Stated another way, how often is the feeling of being 
correct, actually correct? This is a key question tackled by the 
“overconfidence” literature.48 The literature on overconfidence 
has produced hundreds of articles examining how and why 
people tend to feel more certain about facts than they ought to.49 
Thus, the literature can be an important source of information 
with regard to the relationship between the feeling of certainty 
and accuracy.
The term of art used to describe an individual’s feeling 
of certainty in relation to their success rate is “calibration.”50 
A person is well calibrated if her feeling of certainty directly 
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correlates to the accuracy of her predictions.51 To use a concrete 
example from the literature, if in the course of four days it rains 
three times, then a weatherperson who predicted a 75% chance 
of rain on each of those four days is well calibrated, while a per-
son who predicted a 90% chance of rain is poorly calibrated.52
The research has found that at times of high confidence, 
people tend to be poorly calibrated.53 In one study, subjects were 
given a quiz with 180 questions, broken up into ten 18-ques-
tion quizzes.54 The quiz questions were varied and the subject 
matter included science, movies, history, sports, geography, 
and music.55 The subjects were incentivized with cash for ac-
curately predicting how well they would do.56 On average, when 
the subjects felt 90.5% certain, they were only correct 73.1% 
of the time.57 Of note, this 16.6% disparity between certainty 
and accuracy is on the conservative end. Previous studies found 
instances in which those who felt 90% certain their answers 
were correct, correlated as low as 30% to 50% with accuracy.58 
However, the author notes that the higher rate is consistent with 
other research, because participants in this study had access to 
some information regarding correlation between predictions 
and success after different quizzes.59 Thus, the participants had 
information that could help them become better calibrated.
Earlier studies also showed that when people made judg-
ments with extreme confidence there was a poor correlation 
with accuracy.60 For example, in the classic paper Knowing 
with Certainty: The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence, 
researchers found that when subjects indicated they believed 
the odds of being correct were 90.91% (10:1),61 subjects were 
only correct 75% (3:1) of the time.62 Even when expressing 
extremely high odds, such as a-million-to-one, subjects were 
wrong almost 7% of the time.63
The calibration studies demonstrate that overconfidence 
occurs frequently and is not merely a “statistical artifact.”64 
Thus, the onus would seem to be on those who think jurors are 
well calibrated. That is, when the jurors believe themselves to 
be 99% certain of guilt, what makes the trial environment less 
likely to produce a significant discrepancy with accuracy? The 
effect of overconfidence with specific regard to complex legal 
cases and its direct affect on reasonable doubt will be explored 
below.
B. cerTaInTy In uncerTaIn cIrcumsTances:  
 coherence Theory
There is a further empirical reason to believe that the feel-
ing of certainty is poorly calibrated to accuracy and thus, the 
reasonable doubt standard is weak. Since at least the mid-1980s, 
cognitive scientists have found that our brains prefer our beliefs 
to be certain as apposed to ambiguous.65 Specifically, when 
people are presented with complex and ambiguous problems, 
once the person feels the evidence is in favor of one side—no 
matter how slight—there is a strong corresponding feeling of 
certainty. More recently, Dan Simon, a law professor whose 
research focuses on the intersection between law and psychol-
ogy, has run empirical studies that have found coherence-based 
reasoning occurring in subjects who were given ambiguous 
criminal case hypothetical situations and asked to evaluate how 
sure they were of their conclusion (either guilty or innocent).66 
In Simon’s own words, “[c]oherence-based reasoning posits 
that the mind shuns cognitively complex and difficult decision 
tasks by reconstructing them into easy ones, yielding strong, 
confident conclusions.”67 Thus, if jurors initially feel the evi-
dence is ambiguous, but eventually lean slightly towards guilt, 
“the evidence is bolstered from overall ambiguity to a belief 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”68 Therefore, what was meant to be 
the highest standard of proof possible in our legal system, has 
been demoted to what, at best, is no stronger than a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
Recounting the most relevant experiments from Simon’s 
article will provide a better understanding of this neurological 
phenomenon. First, the experimenters had the subjects take a 
pre-test.69 The pre-test required subjects—all of whom were 
jury eligible—to view seven apparently unrelated vignettes.70 
At the end of each vignette, the subjects were asked to assess 
the strength of certain inferences related to the vignette.71 For 
instance, “a vignette that concerned an eyewitness identification 
of a person was followed by a factual question about the likeli-
hood that the identification was correct.” 72
Once the pre-test was finished, the subjects were asked to 
act as jurors in a case requiring suspect identification.73 The 
case had seven pieces of unrelated circumstantial evidence. 
Four pieces were inculpatory and three were exculpatory.74 
The evidence was designed to be “sufficiently multifarious and 
balanced so as to create a complex case.”75 Furthermore, the 
seven pieces of evidence in the case were designed to be “virtu-
ally identical” to the seven pieces of evidence presented to the 
subjects in the first part of the experiment (unbeknownst to the 
subjects).76
Subsequently, the subjects were presented with arguments 
from counsel on both sides pertaining to the inferences from the 
pieces of evidence.77 The subjects were then asked to “render 
a verdict and rate their confidence in the decision.”78 Finally, 
they were asked to determine the likelihood of a defendant’s 
guilt as supported by each piece of evidence.79 Importantly, the 
questions were designed to be “essentially identical” to those 
in the pre-test.80
Despite the pre-test evidence and the subsequent evidence 
being virtually identical, there was a significant shift in cer-
tainty.81 Namely, in the pre-test stage, the subjects who eventu-
ally decided on guilt seemed almost equally convinced by the 
strength of the inculpating evidence as they did by the excul-
pating evidence.82 This was consistent with the experiment’s 
design intent. Yet, at the point that subjects were asked to make 
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a decision on guilt or innocence, those who decided on guilt felt 
the inculpating evidence was very strong, while the exculpating 
evidence was very weak.83 A similar effect was also found with 
subjects who found for innocence.84 
That is, while they found the evidence 
in the pre-test relatively even, by the 
time they had to make a decision they 
felt the exculpating evidence was 
significantly stronger.
These findings were predicted 
and consistent with a previous experi-
ment that used a similar design using 
tort law.85 Similar to the aforemen-
tioned case, subjects in the pretest 
did not show particularly strong 
degrees of certainty, yet once they 
were required to make a decision in 
the second part of the test, “75 percent 
of participants indicated that they had 
maximal or next-to-maximal confi-
dence in their verdicts; conversely, 
only 5 percent indicated low or next-
to-low confidence.”86
All these results bolster, and are 
predicted by, the theory behind coherence-based reasoning. 
That is, after spending time weighing ambiguous and relatively 
complex evidence, subjects tended to feel strong degrees of 
certainty despite their own initial impressions that the evidence 
did not clearly point in favor of one verdict or the other.
c. The exTenT of The ProBLem
While the research in cognitive science shines an unflat-
tering light on our feelings of certainty, it is important not to 
take these findings to extreme nihilistic conclusions. First, 
the overconfidence research still finds a correlation between 
the strength in the feeling of certainty and the accuracy of that 
certainty.87 That is, the more certain one feels, the more likely 
one is to be correct. Yet, this still comes with the caveat that there 
is a dangerous disparity between the degree of certainty and 
the degree of accuracy—a disparity that may lead to pernicious 
effects in criminal trials.88 Second, the coherence research deals 
with complex and ambiguous cases.89 That is, in straightforward 
cases, the worries found in this research are much less appli-
cable.90 This is quite consistent with the overconfidence research 
that has found the polar opposite problem with straightforward 
questions.91 Specifically, there seems to be an underconfidence 
effect where people are presented with straightforward questions 
they should feel quite confident about.92
Thus, while this research does not leave the criminal legal 
system in shambles, its findings are sufficiently robust and 
widespread that a legal system in search of equity must account 
for them.93 Additionally, the issue cannot be fully appreciated 
without addressing an issue that further compounds the problems 
presented in this section. Namely, a juror’s reasons for feeling 
certainty with regard to guilt may rest 
on unconscious biases, unbeknownst 
to the juror.94 Therefore, the juror’s 
ultimate feeling of certainty may be 
premised on little more than a bias 
that nudged them in one direction, 
and due to human nature, produced a 
strong feeling of knowing where such 
a feeling was not warranted.95
The extent of the problem can 
be summarized in two parts. First, in 
ambiguous criminal cases, cognitive 
science tells us that jurors will even-
tually feel strongly towards one side, 
even if they initially felt the evidence 
did not clearly indicate guilt or in-
nocence.96 This is the aforementioned 
problem. Second, unbeknownst to 
jurors, their reasons for feeling that 
one side may possess more credibil-
ity could rest on unconscious biases.97 
Thus, their ultimate feeling of certainty may be premised on 
little more than a bias that nudged them in one direction, and 
due to human nature, produced a strong feeling of knowing.
The following section will look at the second part of the 
problem: unconscious biases.
v. how BIases we cannoT see affecT  
conscIous decIsIon maKIng
[M]ost of our behavior is governed by a cauldron of motives and 
emotions of which we are barely conscious. Your conscious life, 
in short, is nothing but an elaborate post-hoc rationalization 
of things you really do for other reasons.
~V.S. Ramachandran, Neuroscientist 98
This section examines how our decisions can be affected by 
superfluous facts. These irrational yet influential factors all fall 
into the category “biases” in this article. The full impact of these 
biases can only be appreciated in light of the preceding sec-
tion. In particular, while these factors may seem to only slightly 
tilt the scales of decision-making, these slight alterations may 
eventually lead to feelings of certainty as illustrated above. The 
psychological biases literature is expansive. Recently, its im-
portance has been realized and incorporated in disciplines from 
economics to philosophy and law.99 The theme that has attracted 
such disparate disciplines is the fascinating implications they 
Thus, while this research 
does not leave the 
criminal legal system in 
shambles, its findings are 
sufficiently robust and 
widespread that a legal 
system in search of equity 
must account for them.
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have for human reasoning.100 The work in human reasoning has 
even led to a Nobel Prize in economics for one of its pioneers.101 
Given the vastness of the literature, it would make little sense 
to bombard the reader with dozens of studies. Instead, it will be 
helpful to examine some pertinent and representational studies.
a. BIases In raPe cases
Rape is one of the most heinous crimes one human being 
can commit against another. The victim is tormented long after 
the perpetration of the crime.102 The severity of the crime there-
fore makes it all the more disturbing to know that unconscious 
biases can play a significant role in the final verdict.103
In one study cited by Jon Hanson and David Yosifon, 
researchers found that jury-eligible subjects were significantly 
less likely to find that a woman had been raped if the woman 
was viewed as “more respectable.”104 Specifically, the subjects 
found it more likely that a divorced woman had been raped than 
a virgin or married woman.105 This seemingly unintuitive find-
ing is actually compatible with a body of research known as 
“just world theory.”106 In brief, the just world theory postulates 
that as people, we tend to find explanations that are compatible 
with the view that the world is just. Thus, subjects are more 
willing to believe that a divorcee has been raped because it is 
more compatible with a just world than a married woman or 
virgin being raped—due to the latter two being perceived as 
more virtuous.107
Another bias that seeps into rape cases is the beauty 
bias.108 This bias is the favoring of individuals who are deemed 
physically attractive over those who are considered physically 
unattractive.109 Although more intuitive, it is equally disturbing. 
In rape trials this plays out in the form of a jury more readily 
believing an “ugly” man raped a “beautiful” woman than would 
be the case if the man were deemed “handsome” and the woman 
“ugly.”110 Thus, less attractive women are at a greater risk 
of having their rapist found innocent and less attractive men are 
at a higher risk of being found erroneously guilty.111
B. race-Based BIases
Implicit racial biases are most likely to come to mind 
when people hear the word “bias.” The Implicit Association 
Test (IAT), conducted out of Harvard University, is a research 
methodology that studies race bias, amongst other biases, and 
has become popular with legal scholars.112 One race-based IAT 
that has been administered requires people to quickly associate 
“Black names” with positive words, and “White names” with 
negative words.113 Next, the task requires the opposite, quickly 
matching Black faces to negative words and White faces to pos-
itive words.114 The program has found statistically significant 
time differences.115 More explicitly, people tend to more quickly 
attribute positive words to White names and more quickly 
attribute negative words to Black names.116
However, even if this test is actually able to pick out 
implicit biases, what we really care about as a society are 
measurable pernicious effects of these biases.117 Thus, the 
following is a sample of some of the pernicious effects of 
unconscious biases. In their paper, Fair Measures, researchers 
Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji examine an experiment where 
the outcome was readily explainable by IAT results.118 The 
researchers randomly assigned two hundred and ninety-one 
medical interns “to view, read symptom profiles, and make 
diagnosis and treatment recommendations for a hypothetical 
Black or White patient.”119
Consistent with the population of the United States, a 
significantly higher number of Black patients were diagnosed 
with coronary artery disease (CAD) than White patients.120 
Thus, an equitable distribution would require that a higher 
number of Blacks receive the state-of-the-art treatment than 
Whites, in order to stay proportional. Disturbingly however, 
in proportion to the respective population of Black patients, 
significantly fewer of these patients were prescribed the state-
of-the-art treatment than White patients.121 Furthermore, “[t]he 
most highly biased medical interns, as measured by the IAT, 
were also more likely to treat White patients with [the state-
of-the-art treatment], despite their own diagnoses of Black 
Americans’ higher likelihood of” CAD.122
It is important to note that the medical interns were aware 
that their evaluations were being scrutinized, and they therefore 
had a strong incentive to at least appear unbiased, even if they 
realized they harbored racist feelings.123 Thus, these biases are 
likely something the interns were completely unaware of, yet 
could have a profound effect on people’s lives.
It would be surprising if biases found in highly educated 
professionals under scrutiny would somehow disappear when 
jury eligible citizens stepped in a courtroom—especially given 
that the guardian of equity (the reasonable doubt standard) is 
woefully lacking in its current iteration. Fortunately, there is 
little need for major inferences, since a recent article by Justin 
D. Levinson, Huajian Cai, and Danielle Young has specifically 
tested whether race plays a role in jury decision-making with 
respect to guilt.124
Amongst other tasks, sixty-seven jury eligible students 
took an IAT that measured the correlation between Black and 
guilty.125 The IAT results “suggest that participants held an 
implicit association between Black and Guilty.”126 However, 
this alone would not be sufficiently interesting without reasons 
to believe that such implicit biases would lead to pernicious 
consequences. To test this, researchers designed vignettes with 
either a White defendant or a Black defendant.127 These vignettes 
included several pieces of evidence, which were identical 
in both iterations of the vignette.128 The participants were asked 
to indicate how pertinent certain evidence was towards an assess-
ment of guilt.129 The study found that “having stronger implicit 
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associations between Black and Guilty…predicted judgments 
of ambiguous evidence as more indicative of guilt.”130 Finally, 
the implicit nature of these biases is underscored by a surprising 
finding. Namely, researchers found that “implicit attitudes of 
race and guilt are quite different than attitudes of race revealed 
by using explicit measures—in fact, one explicit measure even 
showed opposite results—participants who felt warmer towards 
African Americans actually showed more bias on the Guilty/
Not Guilty IAT.”131
c. mIsceLLaneous BIases
It may be tempting to focus on specific biases and attempt 
to counteract them. Such counteraction could range from calls 
for greater governmental regulation to try and counterweigh the 
unconscious influences consciously132 to jury nullification.133 
Even assuming that these counter measures have equitable 
consequences, the problem of identifying all the biases that exist 
would be a daunting, if not impossible, task. This is because 
the psychological biases literature makes it clear that biases are 
fecund,134 as will be illustrated below.
Due to our heightened awareness of race and sex biases, 
studies concerning biases have tended to focus on these two 
areas. By their very nature, however, unconscious biases are 
difficult to ascertain outside of formal studies.135 Furthermore, 
devising a study presupposes that the researcher believes the 
study will yield interesting results.136 Thus, only the factors 
which researchers assume may be susceptible to biases will be 
studied. To get a sense of how pervasive and surprising some 
of the biases can be, it may help to take a glimpse outside of the 
narrow scope of jury trials.
For example, in one study discussed in the classic paper 
Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental 
Processes,137 researchers Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahnemen 
found that the order in which products were placed in a 
consumer survey created a bias.138 Researchers spread identical 
dresses in one study, and nylons in another so that they were 
in a row.139 Subjects were then asked to pick the “best quality” 
product.140 Subjects were found—particularly in the nylon 
study—to heavily over-choose from the right side.141
This outcome occurred despite the fact that all the products 
were identical. Nisbett and Wilson noted that, “[w]hen asked 
about the reasons for their choices, no subject ever mentioned 
spontaneously the position of the article in the array.”142 
Subjects denied being influenced by the position of the article 
even when specifically asked, “usually with a worried glance 
at the interviewer suggesting that they felt either that they had 
misunderstood the question or were dealing with a madman.”143 
The paper recounted dozens of experiments, all of them tied 
by the theme of people who were consistently unaware as to 
why they chose what they had chosen, or felt the way they had 
felt.144 This was particularly surprising because researchers 
often suggested to the subjects that a certain feature, such as 
order, could have had an effect; yet they denied being aware of 
the order at anytime.145 Another example comes from a study 
conducted by Kenneth Mathews and Lance Canon.146 The 
researchers found that when ambient noise levels were normal 
(approximately 50db), people were almost five times as likely to 
help an apparently injured individual than when ambient noise 
was loud (approximately 87db).147 As one researcher has noted, 
“[t]hese experiments are not aberrational, but representative.”148
d. reasonaBLe douBT couPLed wITh ImPLIcIT BIases
The only assurance of equity, and only barrier against 
implicit biases, is the fact that reasonable doubt is uniformly 
implemented. Due to its malleability, however, the reasonable 
doubt standard tends to be little more than a façade.149 
Furthermore, it is also highly unlikely that the disparities we see 
in such studies are due to jurors not caring. Studies show that 
jurors really do try and apply the standards, but genuinely have 
trouble understanding jury instructions—if provided to them at 
all.150 The eventual prescription compels jurors to essentially 
create their own definition of reasonable doubt by imagining 
what types of evidence would amount to beyond a reasonable 
doubt.151 This mental exercise is done before the facts of the 
case are known, thus preventing the biases from creeping into 
the reasonable doubt analyses.
Again, the extent of the problem can be summarized in two 
parts. First, in ambiguous criminal cases cognitive science tells 
us that jurors will eventually feel strongly towards one side, 
even if they initially felt the evidence did not clearly indicate 
guilt or innocence.152 This was the problem articulated in Section 
IV. Second, unbeknownst to jurors, their reasons for favoring 
one side may possess more credulity based on unconscious 
biases—the problem articulated in this section.153 Thus, their 
ultimate feeling of certainty may be premised on little more 
than a bias that nudged them in one direction, and due to human 
nature, produced a strong feeling of knowing.
vI. seTTIng sTandards Through  
“ruLe-Based BIas fILTerIng”
This section demonstrates how utilizing rule-based 
reasoning can help minimize the extent to which biases play a 
role in our reasoning. In conjunction with Section VII—which 
explains both how reasonable doubt can be defined and used as 
a rule—this section constitutes the prescriptive claim.
The biases that lead us to convict some individuals when 
there is little evidence against them and exonerate others when 
there is a plethora of evidence against them can incite various 
reactions. Some may see the radical cost of revamping the legal 
system as too high, and thus downplay the extent to which these 
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biases undermine the very foundations of this legal system.154 
Others may call for counter and compensatory measures such 
as jury nullification in cases where biases are likely to occur in 
favor of the prosecution.155 Fortunately, by standardizing the 
reasonable doubt concept, many of the biases can be amelio-
rated, without having to choose between doing nothing, and 
possible over-compensation.156
This idea can be illustrated using one of the aforementioned 
biases. For example, if we were to introduce a rule for lending 
aid to people, it could help us eliminate the bizarre environ-
mental noise bias found in the Mathews and Canon study.157 
An aid-lending rule could be formulated as follows: “When 
someone needs help, always assist unless doing so would make 
you late to an important engagement or otherwise harm you.” 
The merits of the rule are not of importance. What is important 
is that by having a rule and following it, the rule may override 
the biases.158 Thus, a subject who applies this rule may still walk 
by someone who needs help while ambient noise is heightened 
and feel no inclination to help. However, having the rule in 
mind gives them a reason to override the lower level bias.159 
The feeling is the same, but now our subject has an anchor by 
which they may effectively filter out the irrelevant “noise”—
both figuratively and literally.
Note that this solution does not 
require the individual to be aware of 
the bias. In fact, there could be biases 
related to aid rendering that are pro-
duced by what we had for breakfast, 
the laundry detergent we use, or the 
color of our underwear. An individual 
may be aware that they are not in-
clined to help the person in distress, 
but they need not know why in order 
to successfully apply the rule. What is 
needed is a contextual cue that trig-
gers the explicit aid-lending rule and 
that the prospective aider follows the 
rule. In this case, the cue is noticing 
an individual in distress. In a jury trial, 
the cue is an explicit jury instruction.
Importantly, there is an inverse 
correlation between the precision of 
the rule and the flexibility of the rule. 
There is also a positive correlation 
between the flexibility of a rule and 
the amount of biases that can seep in. 
For example, suppose if instead of 
the aforementioned assistance rule, we replaced it with: “Help 
someone anytime you feel like it.” Such a vague rule makes a 
person just as susceptible to bias influence as a person with no 
rule. Imagine creating a rule meant to protect one from wily 
sales persons, well-versed in cognitive biases. A rule lacking 
flexibility might be stated as: “Under no circumstance will you 
spend more than $200.” As long as one sticks to the rule, a 
person can feel secure that they will not spend more than they 
had planned on. Compare that to a rule that states: “Spend no 
more than seems reasonable.” While this rule has much greater 
flexibility, it comes at the cost of doing very little to protect 
against biases.
The problem carries over to the reasonable doubt concept. 
The more narrowly one defines reasonable doubt, the less the 
standard is susceptible to biases; but it may also become less 
flexible.160 So how can reasonable doubt keep a degree of flex-
ibility while having the rigidity necessary for rule-based bias 
filtering to work? The following section provides an answer.
vII. usIng KnowLedge By acquaInTance  
To sTandardIze reasonaBLe douBT
This section explains how knowledge by acquaintance can 
be used to define reasonable doubt and serve as a rule through 
which rule-based bias filtering may occur.161 Furthermore, the 
section ends by dispelling a possible 
concern arising out of the literature.
From the lack of a clear defini-
tion, it is apparent that reasonable 
doubt cannot be simply defined using 
words. As one author has observed, 
“[a]ttempts to define reasonable doubt 
simply establish ‘analytic connections 
between words and words[’] that 
belie the concept’s inherent quality 
of vagueness.”162 Instead of words, 
a jury instruction requiring jurors to 
come up with concrete examples that 
serve as definitions should be used. 
These examples act as definitions and 
rules, thus allowing rule-based bias 
filtering to occur. Jurors still have the 
ultimate deciding power with regard 
to whether the criteria are met, but in-
stead of just relying on the unreliable 
feeling of certainty, they can rely on 
an illustrative definition.163
Thinking of cases where we 
would all find a suspect guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt is not difficult. For 
example, a suspect is caught on a clear video recorder commit-
ting a crime, DNA evidence is found at the scene implicating 
the suspect, the suspect had a motive, and there was no evidence 
that undermined those facts. We can also think of cases in which 
Instead of words, a jury 
instruction requiring 
jurors to come up with 
concrete examples that 
serve as definitions 
should be used. These 
examples act as 
definitions and rules, 
thus allowing rule-based 
bias filtering to occur. 
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we definitely would not feel comfortable finding someone 
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. For example, a case where no 
plausible motive is given and the only evidence is a witness 
who saw the individual in the area shortly after the crime was 
committed. Yet, when jurors are asked to come to a decision of 
guilt or innocence they rely on their unreliable feelings.164
The examples are meant to use the juror exemplars as 
anchors to create positive guidelines. Much like it is better 
before one steps into a store to think about what she is willing 
to pay for an item, it is much better to think about what counts 
as reasonable doubt before the trial begins.
These anchors achieve at least three things. One, jurors 
create a standard that can be turned into a rule like the rules 
that were explored earlier, thus helping to filter out biases. 
Specifically, jurors can be instructed that they should not find 
guild beyond a reasonable doubt, “unless the evidence presented 
is comparable to that of your reasonable doubt exemplar.” Two, 
by creating the rule before the facts of the trial are known by 
the jury, it is less likely that unconscious biases will weigh into 
its formulation.165 Finally, the flexibility of the standard is kept. 
Jurors create their own exemplars, thus the worries about strip-
ping the jurors of their ability to use personal beliefs is gone.166
The idea of conscious thoughts (rules in the present case) 
acting to essentially veto lower level thoughts is one supported 
by neuroscientific research.167 The neurophysiologist Benjamin 
Libet’s research putatively demonstrated that our conscious 
“will” to act occurs only after the neural commands for triggering 
that act have occurred.168 Yet, he conceded that his research 
supported the idea that higher order (conscious) thoughts could 
act as a veto mechanism even once the lower order neural 
commands have been triggered.169 Bolstering this position, 
the neurologist John Burton concurs with the aforementioned 
opinion adding, “[i]f you see conscious thoughts as being 
subsequent inputs into the hidden layer, you can see where a 
conscious decision can then be incorporated into unconscious 
decision-making.”170
There is also research at the higher order cognitive levels 
showing that mental models work.171 One study found that 
while “[d]irect approaches, like informing participants of the 
existence of the bias and imploring them to “try harder” or to 
“be unbiased” have been generally unsuccessful, some success 
has been obtained with techniques that induce participants to 
actively create mental models in which they imagine alterna-
tive conclusions by urging them to consider the correctness 
of the opposite conclusion and to note the weaknesses of their 
preferred conclusion.”172 The exemplars would work as alterna-
tive conclusions where needed, that is, where the case at hand 
deviates from the mental model. If a case does not deviate from 
the model, there is no need to imagine alternatives, because 
by comporting with the mental model, the reasonable doubt 
standard has been achieved.
Further support for this idea comes from an unlikely 
candidate, viz. Gregory Mitchell.173 Mitchell, who criticizes 
much of the research in implicit biases used in the legal context, 
points out that part of what makes us uniquely human is our 
ability to correct inaccurate (or biased) thoughts through higher 
order thoughts.174 In short, while humans may have unconscious 
biases, it is not always clear that the biases affect our decision 
making, because we are able to self correct with these “second 
thoughts.”175
Mitchell’s criticism supports the prescriptive claim that 
conscious mental models can serve to override conscious 
biases.176 The rules used in rule-based bias filtering are second 
thoughts that are used to correct potentially pernicious biases.177 
In Mitchell’s own words, use of “mechanical rules and decision 
aids…[make] it more likely that simple computational errors 
and inappropriate weighting of data points will be avoided.”178 
Thus, although Mitchell would generally be viewed as a critic 
of the bias literature in the law, his findings actually support this 
article’s prescriptive claim.
Although Mitchell’s research bolsters the prescriptive 
claim, his views may seem to undermine the descriptive claim.179 
Namely, Mitchell thinks people may automatically correct for 
biases without ever having the need to consciously correct for 
them.180 He argues that cognitive biases are overstated because 
we can correct for such biases.181 Yet, he does not seem to 
provide any data that shows we are more likely than not to filter 
out biases. Furthermore, findings such as those in the work of 
Kang and Benaji182 evidence the fact that these biases may creep 
in even if we take conscious steps to counter them.183
Additionally, while we may be well aware of sex and race 
biases, there may be many biases whose effects we do not fully 
comprehend or even know about (e.g. beauty bias, weight bias, 
tattoo bias).184 Even for unconscious correction to occur under 
Mitchell’s model there must be some impetus—conscious or 
unconscious—that results in second thoughts that correct for 
such biases.185 Assuming a strong impetus to correct for bi-
ases we are completely unaware of seems foolhardy. Thus, in 
addition to Mitchell’s arguments lending support to this article’s 
prescriptive claim, the arguments do little to undermine the 
descriptive claim.
Admittedly, there will always be borderline cases that are 
not only difficult to decide, but which open the door for biases 
our mental models may not foresee. Therefore, the goal is not to 
eliminate implicit biases, but to ameliorate them. Furthermore, 
this solution need not be the only solution. The hope is that it will 
help compliment other solutions such as graphical illustrations 
and instructions simplified with the help of psycholinguistics.186
In particular, jurors should be reminded that those accused 
of crimes need not show any evidence supporting their inno-
cence because they are presumed to be innocent. Also, it may 
help to frame reasonable doubt against the other standards such 
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as preponderance of the evidence. Both of these clarifications 
are easy to explain and are of the utmost importance because 
jurors are often found to not understand them.187 With jury 
instructions that take these standards into account, jurors will 
have sufficient individual flexibility while still being able to 
avoid some of the pernicious effects caused by implicit biases. 
This solution is compatible with a reasonable doubt standard 
that changes based on the severity of a crime or sentenc-
ing (a cost-benefit model of reasonable doubt).188 This could 
be achieved by giving the jury information while they are 
constructing their reasonable doubt exemplars, so as to influ-
ence these mental models. For example, “while thinking about 
what constitutes a reasonable doubt, one should keep in mind 
that the current case carries with it the possibility of death.”189 
Jurors would thus be free to take the penalty into consideration 
when constructing their reasonable doubt mental model.190
vIII. concLusIon
The inherent vagueness of reasonable doubt leaves jurors 
with nothing more to rely on than their gut feelings of 
certainty.191 While these feelings of certainty may sometimes 
rest on well-founded reasons, research in cognitive science 
shows that such feelings are no guarantee of cogent reasoning 
or accuracy.192 Particularly in factually complex and ambiguous 
cases, juror’s feelings may be unconsciously swayed by biases. 
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that it is quite likely 
that laypersons and experts alike have several biases that have 
never been considered.193 In such ambiguous cases, research 
also reveals that jurors are likely to experience strong feelings 
of certainty, not due to factual clarity, but instead due to the 
nature of the human cognitive architecture.194
Fortunately, a standard can be created once it is realized 
that “reasonable doubt,” while not amenable to a customary 
definition, can become an explainable standard by providing 
jurors with examples. Specifically, jurors can be instructed to 
create concrete exemplars of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
through which they may evaluate their final conclusions. 
Cognitive science leads us to believe that such a strategy (rule-
based bias filtering) will help jurors reassess conclusions that 
strongly diverge from the exemplars. This is significant because 
such divergence is indicative of the fact that the conclusions 
were by-products of biases.
Finally, rule-based bias filtering through exemplars is not 
mutually exclusive with other putative solutions to the problem. 
Despite the impressive benefits of rule-based bias filtering, it 
is essential to stay open to the fact that empirical research may 
lead to further solutions. At the very least, empirical research 
may help maximize the manner and timing in which reasonable 
doubt mental models are constructed.
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